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“The adoption of ‘inflation targeting’ (…) is characterized not only by public commitment 
to an explicit target, but also by a commitment to explain the central bank's policy actions 
in terms of a systematic decision-making framework that is aimed at achieving this target.” 
Michael Woodford (2003, page 3) 
 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
What is ECB communication about? More generally, is the ECB transparent 
about its future monetary policy stance? What will the level of the Repo rate be in three 
months from now? These are some of the questions that this paper attempts to answer. 
Put another way, our goal is an analysis of ECB communications, focusing in 
particular on its transparency. 
According to the ECB website1, a central bank is transparent when “[it] provides 
the general public and the markets with all relevant information on its strategy, 
assessments and policy decisions as well as its procedures in an open, clear and timely 
manner”. Therefore, we posit that if the ECB is transparent, then we should be better 
able to forecast its future Repo rate (the ECB's official interest rate, that is, the bid rate 
on its main refinancing operations). Our main findings can be summarized as follows. 
First, by looking at the semantic content of the ECB President’s introductory 
statement to the monthly press conference, we can predict fairly well the ECB near 
future monetary policy moves. In particular, we used the glossary constructed in Rosa 
and Verga (2005) to translate the qualitative information of the press conferences into 
quantitative variables and then we forecasted the future changes (up to a 6-month 
horizon) of the Repo rate as a function, either linear or non-linear, of this new ordinal 
measure. 
Second, by carefully reading most of the ECB official documents, we identified 
a set of economic and monetary variables that may affect its interest rate setting 
behaviour. Then, we used them to estimate the ECB-specific empirical reaction 
function. Obviously, our null hypothesis is that if the ECB is sufficiently transparent, 
we can infer its underlying monetary policy rule. 
Third, we compared the forecasting ability of the two methods explained above 
with the standard benchmark, which consists of applying the expectation hypothesis to 
the term structure of the Euribor rates. It turns out that words and data on economic 
variables are essentially complementary, rather than substitute, pieces of information to 
correctly predict the future Repo rate.  
 
                                                 
1 http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html (lastly accessed on the 31st January 2005). 
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Finally, the by-products of our empirical analysis are that the ECB has a real 
target too and that non-standard econometric techniques, such as fuzzy regression and 
discriminant analysis, do not perform better than standard OLS and ordinal regressions. 
 
1.1   Related literature 
 
Central bankers motivate the need for transparency for the following reasons (cf. 
Issing, 2005).  
First, since central banks are granted the legal status of (at least instrument) 
independence, in order to fulfil one of the basic requirements of a democracy, that is 
accountability, central banks have to be transparent.  
Second, transparency is a necessary ingredient to enhance the efficiency of 
monetary policy. Central banks can directly control only the very short-run nominal 
interest rates, but aggregate-spending decisions are closely related to interest rates of all 
maturities. Therefore, the management of financial market expectations has become a 
crucial instrument in the monetary authority's hands to affect the overall course of the 
economy. Sound credibility and good communication skills (to direct market 
expectations) are essential tools for the effective working of a modern central bank. 
Geraats (2002) provides an excellent overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the transparency of monetary policy. 
Of course, there are many applied econometric papers that attempt to predict 
future monetary policy moves and to find empirical reaction functions. However, there 
is little previous work that attempts to directly estimate a central bank's transparency.  
The papers most closely related to this one would appear to be Rosa and Verga 
(2005), Chevapatrakul et al. (2003) and Gurkaynak et al. (2002)2. 
Rosa and Verga (2005) construct a glossary that translates the qualitative 
information contained in the ECB President introductory statement to the monthly press 
conference into quantitative variables. Then, they use this new ordinal measure to test 
the common knowledge of the ECB transparency. In other words, given that the ECB is 
transparent, does the financial market know it? Does the ECB know that the financial 
                                                 
2 In an independent work (“Interest rate setting by the ECB: words and deeds”, CEPR Discussion Paper 
4775, December 2004), Gerlach solved a related empirical exercise. The main differences between the 
contributions of his paper and ours are the following. First, we estimate a different empirical reaction 
function: we use both a different indicator and set of economic variables. For instance, we do not find any 
role for monetary aggregates when controlling for a larger set of economic variables. Second, we perform 
some robustness checks of our transparency results. On the one hand, we mix together words and 
economic variables, showing that none of them considered in isolation is a sufficient statistics to explain 
the ECB’s behavior. On the other, we compare the forecasting ability of ECB’s words and economic 
variables with market-based measures of monetary policy expectations.  
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market knows that the ECB is transparent? And so forth… Instead, in this paper we use 
their glossary to check the consistency between the European monetary authority’s 
words and its future actions, that is, its future interest rate moves. 
On the one hand, using (high frequency) monthly data, Chevapatrakul et al. 
(2003) show that the Taylor rule is a useful tool to forecast the future Bank of England 
interest rate setting behavior. On the other hand, they find that the information from 
inflation and output gap is an insufficient statistics to predict the direction of the next 
UK monetary authority’s interest rate change compared to a wider information set that 
includes other economic variables such as exchange rate, labor market and factor cost 
information. Although in section 3 of this paper we use the same econometric approach, 
i.e. a generalized Taylor rule, some substantial differences remain. First, we consider 
the ECB reaction function from 1999 to 2004 rather than the BoE reaction function 
from 1993 to 2000. Second, our goal is not only to explain the European monetary 
authority decisions but also, and more importantly, to check the ECB’s transparency. 
Put another way, we are interested to assess the degree of accuracy of ECB explanations 
about its current policy moves: by following ECB instructions, up to what extent could 
we reproduce its decision-making process? 
Gurkaynak et al. (2002) compare the predictive power of a number of short-
maturity financial instruments to measure expectations of the future course of U.S. 
monetary policy. We adopt their empirical framework, the (standard) expectation 
hypothesis applied to the term structure of the Euribor rates, to construct the benchmark 
we have used to assess quantitatively the transparency of the ECB. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we predict future 
monetary policy interventions by analysing the official ECB's documents. In section 3, 
we try to reproduce ECB interest rate setting decisions by estimating an ad hoc 
empirical reaction function. In section 4, we present our forecasting procedure based on 
the expectation hypothesis applied to the term structure of the Euribor rate. In section 5, 
we compare the performance of our three alternative methods of forecasting. Finally, 
section 6 suggests some important issues left for future research and concludes. 
Appendix A provides both the description and the sources of the time series used in the 
estimations. Appendix B and Appendix C describe the methodology and discuss the 
results of applying the fuzzy non-linear regression and the discriminant analysis. 
 
2.   The ECB President press conference 
 
The ECB, or rather its Governing Council, has conducted monetary policy since 
January 1999, and thus is a relatively new central bank. Nonetheless, since the very 
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beginning, the bank has paid a lot of attention to its announcement policy and especially 
to its choice of medium, form and content. For example, in order to properly 
communicate with the public and address the informational needs of the various target 
groups (i.e., politicians, academics, the press, financial markets, etc.), the ECB uses 
many different instruments, such as the Monthly Bulletin, the President monthly press 
conference (and its Questions and Answers session), the Testimony to the Committee 
on Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament (twice a year)3 and frequent speeches 
by either its President or the members of its Governing Council. 
According to the Monthly Bulletin of November 2002 (page 64), the ECB 
President monthly press conference and the Monthly Bulletin constitute its most 
important communication channels. The former is a timely tool to concisely 
communicate to the press the ECB Governing Council's policy relevant assessments of 
recent economic developments. The latter is used by the ECB not only to convey its 
detailed and quantitative view of the economy (thus integrating the information released 
by its President press conference), but also to describe its analytical framework - 
models, methods and indicators - that represents the basis of its decision-making 
process. 
In this section we restrict our analysis to the semantic content of the ECB's 
President introductory statement to the monthly press conference in order to predict the 
future Repo rate. Note that although both the Editorial section of the Monthly Bulletin 
and the introductory statement report the same information concerning the ECB 
monetary policy stance, we concentrate our attention to the latter document because the 
former is made available to the public only with a time lag. 
In exposing its opinions, the ECB has always used a very limited number of key 
words and strings, and employed a very standardized form of language. Moreover, 
thanks to the journalists' questions during the press conferences, the ECB President has 
further explained the meaning of some words. For instance, at the press conference of 
the 6th March 2003 President Duisenberg declared that: “Well, if we use the word 
‘appropriate’ we expect it to remain valid for a considerable period of time”. Therefore, 
today it is not difficult to draw conclusions about the Bank's sentiment. 
There are three main hypotheses underlying our empirical exercise. 
First, the central bank's information set should not be weakly included in that of 
the financial markets. Romer and Romer (2000), among others, support this hypothesis 
by showing that central banks produce better forecasts for the economic outlook than 
private sector forecasters: after all, this seems very intuitive since central banks are 
                                                 
3 Before March 2001, it was called either Hearing before the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs of the European Parliament or Speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
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usually active decision-makers and can control, at least to some extent, the future course 
of the economy. 
Second, the monetary authority should not face a severe time-inconsistency 
problem (cf. Barro and Gordon, 1983). In other words, when the incongruence of 
preferences between the central bank and the private sector is not too large, there is no 
incentive for the central bank to misrepresent its private information. 
Third, the public should understand the language used by the monetary 
authority. 
We can synthetically rephrase the three assumptions above by stating that if the 
central bank releases new, true, and clear information (cf. Winkler, 2000), then the 
public should pay attention to it. Note that if at least one of these assumptions is not 
satisfied, our empirical exercise will be meaningless. 
The glossary (reported) in Table 1 (see Rosa and Verga (2005) section three for 
further details about its construction) is employed to rank the words used in speeches 
into an ordered scale of numbers representing the degree of risk to price stability. We 
have thus transformed all the ECB President's statements into something suitable for 
statistical analysis. 
Our assigned value of risk, Index, to each ECB monetary policy announcement 
is reported in Table A1 of Appendix A. Recall that this Index is a summary statistics of 
the ECB Governing Council view about both the future prospects of inflation and real 
activity in the Euro area. In fact, in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty (which 
established the European Union and, as a by-product, the European System of Central 
Banks), the ECB has both a nominal (i.e., inflation) and real (i.e., output growth) 
objective4. However, note that the latter ECB goal is subordinated to the achievement of 
the former: more formally, ECB preferences can be represented by a lexicographic 
utility function with price stability and economic growth being respectively its first and 
second argument. 
Therefore, the words about real activity become relevant only when there are no 
inflation risks. 
We estimate the following equation for the period January 1999-June 2004: 
  
Rt+m - Rt = α + βIndext  + εt       (1) 
 
                                                 
4 Article 105 states: “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the 
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid 
down in Article 2 [i.e., sustainable economic growth]”. 
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where Rt+m stands for the Repo rate in force within m months from today (t). α is 
a constant and ε stands for a zero-mean noise term uncorrelated with Index. 
We consider only the days of the ECB Governing Council meetings. Although 
the ECB Governing Council meets twice a month, since November 2001 the Repo rate 
could be changed only at its first meeting. Both to be consistent over time and to have 
(more or less) monthly data (and thus monthly-frequency forecasts), for the period 
January 1999 – October 2001 we have considered only the first meeting of every month. 
Moreover, overall we have 56-57 observations (cf. Table A1), since in August there is 
no ECB Governing Council meeting (and thus no press conference). Finally, for 
simplicity, we have assumed that each meeting takes place every 30 days. 
Note that by construction the econometrician’s information set contains only one 
element, which is a summary of the information released in the most recent ECB 
President press conference.  
In order to have a straightforward interpretation of our empirical results we have 
used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation with HAC-t statistics. Since it is not the 
most appropriate econometric technique, below we will explore some alternative 
econometric methods, such as ordered probit (in section 5) and fuzzy regression (in 
Appendix B). 
Table 2 reports the estimations of equation (1) coefficients for m = 1,…, 6. As 
ex-ante expected, β is always positive and statistically significant. Thus, the probability 
of future monetary policy interventions (namely, a change in the Repo rate) is an 
increasing function of the absolute value of Index. For example, if today the ECB 
President says that “it is imperative to contain upward pressure to price stability”, then 
the Repo rate on average will increase by about 50 basis points within the next three 
months. 
α turns out to be always negative and sometimes significant at the 5% level: this 
seems to indicate that β is downward distorted. In other words, to have an unbiased 
Index, we need to slightly scale down the degree of risk reported in Table 1, but at the 
same time still preserving its relative ranking. Hence, for instance, the word 
“appropriate” should be associated to a negative number. This can be easily rationalized 
by recalling the ECB objectives postulated by the Maastricht Treaty: when there are no 
risks to price stability, the European monetary authority should achieve sustainable 
economic growth, and, thus, should be inclined to an expansionary monetary policy. 
However, note that the distortion of β is small. In fact, by estimating a constrained 
version of (1), with α = 0, the R2 drops (obviously, since now the estimation becomes a 
constrained minimization problem), but not substantially.  
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3.   Economic and monetary variables and ECB’s interest rate forecasts 
 
Taylor (1993) showed that the U.S. Federal Reserve monetary policy at the 
beginning of the nineties responded to the U.S. output gap and inflation rate. Put 
another way, it was possible to reproduce the Fed interest rate decisions by looking at 
the behaviour of those economic variables. 
Several papers (among others, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and Ullrich (2003)) have 
recently provided evidence that the Taylor rule explains quite well also the ECB's past 
and current interest rate setting behaviour. Nonetheless, in its Monthly Bulletin of 
October 2001 (page 50), the ECB stated that “the use of any of these rules [such as 
Taylor's one], even if only as benchmarks, would in many circumstances be misleading 
and not contribute to a better understanding of monetary policy. Thus, there is no 
convincing alternative to explaining monetary policy decisions in a way that 
corresponds closely to the internal framework of analysis underlying the central bank’s 
decision-making process”. Hence, on the one hand, a simple Taylor rule approach to 
monetary policy would contradict what the Bank itself says. On the other hand, even if 
we agree with the Bank’s opinion that monetary policy is too complicated to be 
represented by a simple formula, we are also convinced that its main features are known 
to its officials and do not change too much over time. Therefore, some kind of rule can 
be submitted to empirical analysis, since, after all, the ECB’s behaviour is not random. 
In order to detect the economic and monetary variables that the ECB seems to 
consider more relevant for its policy decisions, we examined all official documents in 
which the ECB explained the reasons for its various interventions. 
To give a broad idea of the variables that are involved, we report in Table A2 a 
simple (we have just used a counting rule) list of economic and monetary indicators 
cited by the ECB in its Monthly Bulletin and its President monthly press conference. 
However, note that some variables are mentioned to emphasize that they are not 
important for the monetary policy decisions. For instance, in the Monthly Bulletin of 
December 2001 (page 5) it is stated: “When comparing current monetary developments 
with the reference value for the rate of growth of M3, it should be kept in mind that the 
reference value is a medium term concept. In particular, temporary deviations of M3 
from levels in line with its long-term determinants are not unusual (…). Such temporary 
deviations do not necessarily have implications for future price developments”. 
Obviously, if the ECB is transparent, we could reproduce its interest rate setting 
decisions by identifying the right set of economic and monetary variables. 
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We have estimated the following regression again for the period January 1999-
June 2004: 
 
Rt+m - Rt = α + Xt β + εt       (2) 
 
where β is a column vector of regression coefficients and Xt is the row of time t 
observations of the matrix whose columns correspond to either a monetary or an 
economic time series. 
Again, as in section 2, we have used OLS estimation to simplify the 
interpretation of the regression results. However, in Appendix C, in order to check the 
robustness of our empirical conclusions, the discriminant analysis was applied as a 
statistical forecasting model. Moreover, to allow a direct comparison with the findings 
of the previous section we have considered the same monthly observations: the 
information set used to estimate (2) is clearly different and disjointed from the one used 
to estimate (1), nonetheless we have considered the availability of data at the same dates 
ts. 
Note that for each variable at t, the analysis has considered only the values that 
were really available (Orphanides, 2001). In other words, we estimate real-time 
empirical reaction functions: we have used the (preliminary and incomplete) data that 
are contained in the financial market information set at t, rather than final and revised 
macroeconomic data. 
It turns out that the most important variables are the following: 
1. The present rate of inflation (more precisely, the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices), INFLt. Although the ECB tries to act in advance, the higher current inflation 
is, the more likely an increase in its official interest rate will be. 
2. The current Repo rate, Repot. Monetary policy rules or reaction functions usually 
exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate5. Moreover, if the 
official interest rate is already high (low), a further increase (decrease) is less likely. 
3. The rate of growth of industrial prices (net of energy and unprocessed food prices), 
INFLNt. Given HICP, an upward intervention is more probable if this index – a sort 
of measure of core inflation – is growing fast. 
4. The real annual growth rate of the Euro compared with the US Dollar (measured in 
US$ needed to buy 1 €), gEt. For instance, an appreciation of the Euro reduces the 
risk of inflation and thus a decrease of the ECB official interest rate is more likely. 
Note that since in the period 1999-2004 the difference between European and 
                                                 
5 A survey of the main reasons for policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behaviour by central banks can 
be found in Gerlach-Kristen (2004, page 1) and Rudebusch (2002, footnote 17). 
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American inflation has been approximately constant, we could have used the 
nominal (rather than the real) appreciation / depreciation of the Euro against the US 
Dollar. 
5. The level and annual growth of GDP and industrial production (utilized capacity), 
respectively GDPt, gGDPt, PRODt, gPRODt. We expect that a reduction in the ECB 
official interest rate is more likely when both economic growth is low and there are 
no upward inflation risks. 
6. The “economic sentiment indicator”, SENTt. The reasons to include this index in our 
regression specifications are the same as the ones mentioned in the previous point. 
But the sentiment indicator has three main advantages6. First, its data are available 
before those of GDP and industrial production. Second, it seems to anticipate these 
real variables. And, third, it is less volatile than them. 
Other variables, such as wages, oil prices and monetary aggregates, turned out to 
be not relevant when the variables mentioned above were already taken into account in 
our empirical analysis. 
In order to avoid collinearity, particularly strong among the real variables, four 
synthetic indices for utilized capacity and economic growth were calculated. The first 
one, CAPt, is the mean value of the (normalized) residuals of GDP, industrial 
production and “economic sentiment indicator” from their (Hodrick-Prescott) filtered 
values, and it is a sort of utilized capacity index. Since the data about GDP and 
industrial production are published with a lag, we have constructed another index, 
CAPFt. In it, the missing data of GDPt and PRODt were estimated on the basis of the 
“economic sentiment indicator”, which is published only with one-month delay. This 
index is more useful than an analogous one in which only the data actually available 
were considered. Other two indices, gREALt and gREALFt, were derived in the same 
manner as CAPt and CAPFt, but they were based on gGDPt, gPRODt and gSENTt. 
Table 3 reports the regression results of the following specification of (2): 
 
Rt+m - Rt = α + β1(Repot -INFLt)+ β2(INFLt -INFLNt)+ β3 CAPFt + β4 gEt+εt      (2’) 
 
The coefficients of all variables (βs) have their ex-ante expected sign. In 
deciding its interest rate setting decisions, the ECB takes into account the level of 
inflation together with its causes, and the real sector conditions. Moreover, the presence 
of gE in the right-hand side (RHS) of (2’) implies that the ECB also considers the 
                                                 
6 Using EuroCOIN data (available at http://www.cepr.org/data/EuroCOIN, lastly accessed on the 31st 
January 2005), instead of Sentt, does not affect our overall estimation results. 
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effects of the exchange rate channel of the monetary transmission mechanism in terms 
of both net external demand and import prices (cf. Ball, 1999).  
β1 is always negative and significantly different from zero: hence, the short-run 
real interest rate is a mean-reverting process. 
CAPF can be interpreted as a forward-looking monthly output gap proxy, and its 
coefficient is significantly positive, as economic theory suggests. 
Finally, note that the ECB reacts strongly to core inflation (-β2), but less 
vigorously to a more general HIPC (β2- β1). 
In terms of adjusted R2, the model seems to represent the ECB’s interest rate 
setting behaviour fairly well, especially for a forecasting horizon between 3 and 5 
months. 
The role of forecasts on inflation and GDP is critical in estimating (2). Since 
ECB’s own forecasts are available only twice a year (too little for our empirical 
purposes), we have used the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data. 
Nonetheless, if we include them in the RHS of (2’), their coefficient is never 
significantly different from zero. This can be explained by the fact that SPF data are 
constructed on the maintained hypothesis that the ECB will act in order to achieve its 
target (i.e., an inflation level somewhat below 2% in the medium term). Hence, the 
information that Professional Forecasters convey lose a great deal of their relevance and 
are often misleading.   
Finally, note that we have included no lags of the regressors Xt in the 
specification of (2). In other words, we have implicitly assumed that a Markovian 
process governs the evolution of Xt. It is clearly a simplification. However, the 
regressors’ coefficients of many lags turned out to be not significantly different from 
zero once we include them in (2) (regression results not reported). 
 
4.   Euribor rates term structure 
 
In this section we evaluate econometrically the ability of financial market 
interest rates to capture expectations for the future course of the ECB monetary policy 
over different time horizons. In particular, we first review the empirical framework 
underlying the derivation of the forecasting equations. And then we proceed to the 
estimation of the parameters of the interest rate forecasting regressions. 
Most short-run interest rates are closely related to short-run expectations about 
future monetary policy moves: this relationship arises because financial intermediaries 
can potentially choose between different short-term financial strategies. 
The Euribor rate is the interest rate in force in the interbank market and clearly if 
banks are good forecasters of the future ECB monetary policy, then the Euribor rate 
 11
should anticipate the Repo movements7. This hypothesis is confirmed by Figure 1, 
which contains the plot of the Repo rate in the sample period together with the one-
month and six-month Euribor rate: they almost overlap! 
Both the absence of arbitrage opportunities and the ability of borrowers to resort 
to different lenders imply that the financial cost rt,k to borrow money on the interbank 
market for k months starting at day t is equivalent to the expected cost of borrowing 
from the central bank again from day t to day t+k months, up to a risk premium γ 
(returns in excess of the risk-free rate). Hence,  
 
γ+

 −+= ∏−
=
++
1
0
, 1)1(
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j
jttktt REr       (3) 
 
where the notation is the same as before. 
Equation (3) can be theoretically motivated by relying on standard asset pricing 
formulas, and specifically to the stochastic pricing kernel (see, for example, Campbell et 
al. (1997), chapter 8 and 10)8. 
In the empirical literature is often assumed that  γ is time-invariant and this 
assumption is also known as the expectation hypothesis. We have deferred the 
discussion about the implications of allowing predictable time-varying risk premia in 
the conclusion. 
In order to derive the specification of the interest rate forecasting regression, we 
can rearrange (3) as: 
 
 Rt,k =  α + β rt,k +ε t       (4) 
 
whereRt,k is defined as [ ]∏ −= + −+10 1)1(kj jtR  and ε t stands for a stochastic zero-
mean forecast error,Rt,k - Et[Rt,k], which is uncorrelated with all available information 
at time t. 
Obviously, under the maintained hypotheses of both no arbitrage opportunities 
and constant risk premia, we should find that β equals 1 and α equals -γ. 
                                                 
7 Note that market expectations about the ECB future monetary policy can also be proxied by the futures 
contract on the Euribor (Bernoth and von Hagen, 2004). Nevertheless, our main results continue to hold: 
in fact, Euribor rates of return on futures contracts are highly positively correlated to the underlying 
Euribor implicit rates of return. 
8 Note that in the ECB case γ contains also an econometrically indistinguishable transaction cost 
component. Borrowing from the central bank is more costly than borrowing from the interbank market 
since in the first situation the loan is backed by the deposit of a security collateral whose rate of return is 
lower that the one granted by the market. 
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Phillips-Perron cointegration tests (not reported here for reasons of space, but 
available from the authors upon request) reject the unit root hypothesis for the first 
differences of Euribor interest rates, but not for their levels. Moreover, the cointegration 
Johansen estimations confirm that every couple of interest rates is cointegrated with a 
slope equal to 1. However, note that the non-stationarity of the data may disappear as 
more observations for the euro area become available, since interest rates are likely to 
be stationary in large samples. 
If we estimate directly (4), then we are going to find the cointegrating vector (a 
long-run relationship), rather than the coefficients of the short-run interest rate 
forecasting regression. To avoid this econometric problem, we stochastically detrend (it 
is a common practice) both sides of (4): 
 
 Rt,k - Rt =  α + β (rt,k - Rt)+ε t      (5) 
 
The parameters α and β have the same interpretation as before, but the R2 
statistic now measures the fraction of changes in the Repo rate explained by the Euribor 
rate curve. 
If we are interested in predicting the Repo rate over some interval beginning at 
some point in the future, we can easily extend (5) as follows: 
 
 Rt+k,t+k+n - Rt =  α + β (rt,t+k,n - Rt)+ε t     (6) 
 
where rt,t+k,n stands for the (implicit) Euribor rate quoted on day t for an 
interbank loan for n months starting at day t+k months.  
Again the coefficients α and β have the same interpretation as before but the R2 
statistic now measures the ability of the Euribor rate to forecast changes in the Repo rate 
from its current level to its average level over some interval in the future. 
Table 4 reports our estimations of (6) for the period January 1999-June 2004 
when n = 1 and k = 1, …, 6. In all regressions, the Wald test of the expectation 
hypothesis (i.e., β = 1) is never rejected. Therefore, we decided to estimate (6) with the 
constraint β = 1, that is: 
 
Rt+k,t+k+n - rt,t+k,n  = α +ε t       (7) 
 
Note that in this formulation -α represents the risk premium: it is both positive 
(always statistically different from zero) and increasing over time. 
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The R2 of the constrained estimation is just slightly lower than before, 
confirming that the above restriction is almost slack. Moreover, R2 is an hump-shaped 
function of k, reaching its maximum, 0.71, at k = 4. 
The intuition of this result is that forecasting the exact timing of European 
monetary policy intervention is a difficult job for the market: in fact, R2 reaches its 
minimum level for the one-month prediction (k = 1) of the Repo rate. Since for our 
purposes (when k is larger than 2) a change of the Repo rate of 50 basis points (bps) all 
at once in one meeting is equivalent to a change of 25 bps in two consecutive meetings9, 
we observe that as k increases, R2 increases as well. However, this flexibility property 
of the prediction is outweighed for large forecasting horizons (k longer than 4) by the 
higher environmental uncertainty. 
Finally, note that the findings of Table 4 are broadly consistent with older 
studies on market predictability of ECB policy decisions, such as Perez-Quiros et al. 
(2002) and Ross (2002): financial markets forecast quite well future ECB monetary 
policy moves. 
 
5.   A comparison of the three alternative methods of forecasting 
 
Our previous analysis has shown that ECB’s statements on the risk to price 
stability, a set of economic variables that the Bank considers important for its goals, and 
the term structure of Euribor rates convey useful information on the future behaviour of 
its official interest rate. 
Table 5 reports the corrected classification of the sign of the predicted interest 
rate changes10 by using an ordered probit (Vanderhart, 2000) as econometric tool and 
three different set of regressors, respectively given by the Index about the ECB 
perceived risk to European price stability (cf. section 2), real-time economic variables 
(cf. section 3) and the Euribor term structure (cf. section 4). Diebold and Kilian (2001) 
have shown that the R2 of the OLS regression provides a good measure of the 
forecasting ability of future interest rate changes. Note that our qualitative conclusions 
would not substantially change if we used the goodness of fit reported in Table 2, 3 and 
4 (i.e., by using the standard Least Squares of the exact predicted Repo rate change), 
                                                 
9 There are two other possible explanations for this counterintuitive phenomenon. On the one hand, our 
sample size is small and k = 1 case may be due simply to a “bad” time series realization and thus it is not 
a systematic finding. On the other, the risk premium is more volatile for short maturities. And, in this 
case, market liquidity conditions become relatively more important as a determinant of the corresponding 
rate of return. Therefore, there is a further error component in the estimation, with the consequence of 
worsening the fit of the regression. 
10 The function sign (∆Repot) takes value 1 when ∆Repot = {0.25,0.5}, 0 when ∆Repot = {0} and -1 when 
∆Repot = {-0.25,-0.5}. 
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rather than the corrected classification of the ordered probit estimation about the 
predicted sign of the Repo rate change. 
  As expected, and except in one isolated case (i.e., using Index as explanatory 
variable for the one-month forecast of the sign of the Repo change11), the market-based 
measures of future monetary policy moves, proxied by the implicit Euribor rate, 
represent an upper bound on the ability of statistical models to forecast future changes 
in the Repo rate. This finding supports the classical view that prices incorporate all 
available information. And as Rudebusch (1998), among others, once underlined, this is 
due to the flexibility of market forecasts in processing and then incorporating new 
information. Evans (1998) confirms this fact for the U.S. Fed fund rate. In particular, he 
found that although real-time Taylor rules describe quite well the Fed reaction function, 
their corresponding forecasts have a standard deviation that is 50 percent larger than the 
implied forecasts from the Fed funds futures market contracts. 
Moreover, note that in no case our estimates make large forecasting errors, that 
is suggest future increases in the Repo rate when the actual movements were downward, 
or vice versa. 
A second result stemming from Table 5 is that ECB words provide better and 
more comprehensive information than economic variables in order to predict the ECB 
future behavior.  A natural question arises: is the semantic content of the ECB 
President’s introductory statement to the monthly press conference a sufficient statistics 
to summarize all the hard information contained in the economic data? 
Table 6 provides a quantitative answer by predicting the Repo change using both 
ECB words and economic variables as right-hand side regressors. On the one hand, the 
coefficient of Index is always positive and significantly different from zero. On the 
other, the coefficients of some economic variables, such as the short-run real interest 
rate or the core inflation, remain significant and with the right sign. Therefore, words 
are complementary to (rather than a substitute for) numbers. And to enhance ECB 
transparency both documents, i.e. press conference and Monthly Bulletin, are needed.  
 Third, and not surprisingly, Table 5 shows that the forecasting ability of all three 
set of regressors decreases more or less monotonically over time: it is more difficult to 
predict the Repo rate in force in six months from now rather than the Repo level that 
will be decided in next month’s Governing Council meeting. 
                                                 
11 However, note that the efficiency of market-based measures of ECB monetary policy expectations has 
increased over time. More specifically, by restricting the sample period to January 2002-June 2004 
(regression results not reported), the Euribor rate turns out to be always the best predictor of the sign of 
the future changes of the Repo rate. In other words, at the beginning of the ECB’s life, there were some 
arbitrage opportunities, which were not exploited by the market. Obviously, this last claim is true 
provided that the glossary of Table 1 has been constructed in real-time and not with the hindsight. 
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6.   Conclusions 
 
In this paper we show that nowadays bankers are not boring at all (cf. Lambert, 
2004). In particular, ECB communications can convey useful information about the 
short-run dynamics of the Repo rate. In other words, this paper develops a new 
methodological approach to study central banks' interest rate setting behaviour by 
looking at the precise wording that has been used. Moreover we found that the ECB is 
transparent, and therefore its words are usually followed by consistent facts. 
Alternatively, and more prosaically, this paper can be reinterpreted as both 
proposing and comparing three different methods to forecast the ECB's official interest 
rate. The first alternative analyses the semantic content of the ECB President's 
statements at the monthly press conference. With the second method we try to detect the 
main economic and monetary variables that drive the ECB's interest rate setting 
behaviour. And, finally, we look at the term structure of the Euribor rates. Note that 
even if we found that all these alternatives are useful in forecasting official interest rate 
movements, they are not equivalent, and, above all, they convey different information. 
Hence, the optimal forecasting strategy consists in combining all these methods (Billio 
et al., 2000): predictions are more reliable when they are similar. 
Of course, some important issues are not considered in this paper and deserve 
further study. 
In section 4 we have made the implicit assumption that the risk premium on 
Euribor contracts (proxied by -α) is constant over time. Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) 
show that for the period 1988-2003 (sixteen years) excess returns on U.S. federal funds 
futures have been time-varying and, more specifically, strongly countercyclical. 
Moreover, they found that excess returns could be well predicted by macroeconomic 
indicators. Therefore, they conclude that futures-based measures of the future path of 
monetary policy should be adjusted to account for these variable excess returns (see in 
particular Figure 6 in their paper). Is this also true for the European case? We have 
tentatively tried to replicate their exercise by regressing (OLS with HAC standard 
errors) the risk premium for various maturities (defined asRt+k,t+k+1  – rt,t+k,1 in our 
notation) on a constant and a vector of variables known to financial markets at time t 
(regression results not reported). The constant turns out to be always positive and 
significantly different from zero. While the regressor coefficients on employment 
growth and financial business cycle indicators such as corporate bond spreads were 
systematically insignificantly different from zero. Perhaps, either our sample (six and a 
half years) is too short to investigate this issue or we have not identified the right set of 
explanatory variables. 
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In order to adequately capture the effects of U.S. monetary policy on asset 
prices, Gurkaynak et al. (2004) found that at least two factors are required. They 
interpret the first one as the current federal funds target rate and the second one as the 
future path of policy, which is closely associated with FOMC announcements. It would 
be interesting to qualify their claim that words speak at least as loud as actions. Does the 
semantic content (that is, the strength) of the words that the central bank has used 
matter? And our tentative answer is an unconditional “Yes, it does”: not only is 
important that the ECB speaks, but also what it says! 
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    Table 1.  – Glossary of ECB’s official statements and their ranking 
 
 
ECB’s main statements: the most important keywords 
Degree 
of risk 
Imperative that upward pressure to be contained – Essential short-term movements of 
inflation do not become protracted and translate into second round effects – [We assure 
that] price stability in the euro area will be maintained – [We assure that ECB will] take 
appropriate action if and when required – Risks [to price stability] are upward (upside) – 
The risks to price stability are confirmed - Vigilant (vigilance) – Alert – Assessed 
continuously – Close monitored. – Continuous close attention 
+3 
Both confident and vigilant - Good however vigilant - Downward risks have receded 
further +2 
The downside risks have disappeared – Somewhat less favourable – Upward pressure 
remain contained – rather balanced – Mixed signals – Uncertainty –  [Price perspectives 
are] less satisfactory but further evidence is needed 
+1 
Appropriate – Favourable – Compatible – Consistent – In line – Balanced – No strong 
pressures either upward or downward – Absence of significant pressures either upwards 
or downwards 
0 
Upward risks to price stability have diminished [even if not fully disappeared] – 
Improvement [in inflation risks] – Inflationary pressures have further diminished (or: are 
lower) – Favourable, but there are some [downside] risks – Appropriate but remain 
downside risks – Balanced but monitor closely all [downside] factors  
-1 
Consistent, but carefully monitor all [downside] risks to economic growth – Monitor 
carefully all [downside] factors relevant to economic growth – Downside risks are still 
relevant – Economic slowdown is still cause for concern – Downside risks are not 
vanished 
-2 
[Strong] downside risks for economic activity – Monitor closely the downside risks to 
economic growth. -3 
NOTE: This table is borrowed from Rosa and Verga (2005).  
 
Table 2.  – Prediction of the Repo change using ECB words 
  
Meetings of the Governing Council after:   
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
α -0.021 -0.053 -0.083 -0.101 -0.117 -0.146
Pr(α=0) 0.156 0.042 0.036 0.058 0.128 0.143
β 0.072 0.112 0.156 0.199 0.231 0.256
Pr(β=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.434 0.474 0.570 0.605 0.524 0.477
 α 
 fr
ee
 
Adj. R2 0.424 0.465 0.561 0.598 0.515 0.467
β 0.070 0.109 0.151 0.192 0.223 0.246
Pr(β=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000α =
0 
co
n-
st
ra
in
t 
R2 =Adj.R2 0.421 0.436 0.512 0.550 0.477 0.424
Observations 56 56 56 57 57 56 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 1999 – June 2004. The 
econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares with HAC-t statistics (Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard 
errors). The independent variable is the mean of Risk ( (min+max) / 2 reported in Table A1). 
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Table 3.  – Prediction of the Repo change using real-time economic variables 
  
Meetings of the Governing Council after:  
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months
0.276 0.413 0.577 0.773 1.074 1.222
Constant (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
-0.143 -0.233 -0.319 -0.388 -0.514 -0.607
Repo-INFL (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.099 -0.150 -0.228 -0.336 -0.475 -0.515
INFL-INFLN (0.038) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.022) (0.036)
0.118 0.203 0.308 0.364 0.409 0.366CAPF (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.040)
-0.007 -0.010 -0.013 -0.017 -0.025 -0.033gE  
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.020) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.324 0.372 0.465 0.439 0.450 0.418 
Adj. R2 0.271 0.323 0.423 0.395 0.407 0.372 
Observations 56 56 56 57 57 56 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 1999 – June 2004. The 
econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares with HAC-t statistics (Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard 
errors). p-value in brackets.  
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Figure 1.  -  Repo and Euribor rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The sample is January 1999-June 2004, daily data. In order to have a sensibile plot, the median 
value of the risk premium together with the implicit cost of borrowing from the central bank , defined 
asRt+k,t+k+1 - rt,t+k,1 with k = 0 and 5 (the notation is the same as before), is subtracted from the Euribor 
implict rate. 
 
 
 
Table 4.  – Prediction of the Repo change using the Euribor rate 
 
 
Meetings of the Governing Council after:   
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
α -0.124 -0.188 -0.229 -0.266 -0.307 -0.383
Pr(α=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
β 0.823 0.934 0.963 1.079 1.111 1.135
Pr(β=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.458 0.517 0.639 0.714 0.662 0.603
β  
fr
ee
 
Adj. R2 0.448 0.508 0.632 0.708 0.655 0.598
Wald test (β=1)  
F statistics 0.237 0.634 0.793 0.526 0.494 0.523 
α -0.148 -0.199 -0.236 -0.251 -0.283 -0.349
Pr(α=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000β =
 1
 
co
n-
 
st
ra
in
t 
R2 =Adj.R2 0.437 0.514 0.638 0.710 0.655 0.595
Observations 56 56 56 57 57 56 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 1999 – June 2004. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares with HAC-t statistics (Heteroskedasticity - Consistent 
standard errors).  
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 
5.0 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 m o n t h Eu r i b o r 
R e p o ( d a i ly m o v i n g aver a g e o f n e x t 1 m o n th)
1.6
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
6 mo nth Eu r i b o r 
Repo (mov i n g a v e r g a g e o f n e x t 6 months)
 23
 
 
Table 5.  – Corrected classification in %  
 
Meetings of the Governing Council after:   
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months
Index 87.5 75 69.6 71.9 66.7 67.8
Economic variables 80.3 64.3 69.6 68.4 66.7 66.1
Euribor rate 85.7 82.1 82.1 87.7 71.9 71.4
Observations 56 56 56 57 57 56
 
NOTE:  Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 1999 – June 2004. 
The dependent variable is the sign of the change in the Repo rate. The econometric method is ML – 
Ordered Probit (Quadratic hill climbing). 
 
 
Table 6.  – Prediction of the Repo change using both ECB words and real-time economic variables 
  
Meetings of the Governing Council after:   
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months
0.103 0.172 0.257 0.281 0.517 0.539
Constant (0.154) (0.064) (0.079) (0.116) (0.031) (0.067)
-0.071 -0.131 -0.182 -0.184 -0.283 -0.327
Repo-INFL (0.032) (0.003) (0.014) (0.036) (0.015) (0.010)
-0.038 -0.068 -0.119 -0.164 -0.281 -0.276
INFL-INFLN (0.282) (0.138) (0.085) (0.042) (0.021) (0.073)
-0.014 0.009 0.053 -0.009 -0.013 -0.142CAPF (0.727) (0.856) (0.507) (0.919) (0.900) (0.261)
-0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 -0.014gE  
 (0.241) (0.298) (0.444) (0.630) (0.357) (0.218)
0.081 0.122 0.159 0.229 0.260 0.314Index (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.516 0.565 0.663 0.711 0.672 0.659 
Adj. R2 0.468 0.522 0.630 0.682 0.640 0.625 
Observations 56 56 56 57 57 56 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 1999 – June 2004. The 
econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares with HAC-t statistics (Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard 
errors). p-value in brackets.  
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Appendix A – Data 
 
For details on Euribor, see http://www.euribor.org/html/content/euribor_tech.html. 
 Daily data on Euribor interest rates (rt,k,n  for k = 1, …, 6) are downloadable from 
the Treasury Management database website, http://www.tmpages.com/tmp55.htm, and, 
in particular, on the page of "EurIBOR: Comprehensive history from National Bank of 
Belgium and TMP: EONIA and EurIBOR (all terms)". Note that Euribor interest rates 
with maturity of two months or more are referred to the day after the ECB Governing 
Council meeting 
Data on REPOt, INFLt, INFLNt, gEt, PRODt, GDPt, gPRODt, gGDPt, 
Unemployment can be found in the “Euro area statistics” section of the Monthly 
Bulletin available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/mb/html/index.en.html  
gEt can be downloaded from the ECB website 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/index.en.html 
CAPt, CAPFt, gREALt, gREALFt are derived from our computation on ECB 
data. 
Et[gGDPt+1year], Et[gGDPt+2years], Et[INFLt+1year], Et[INFLt+2years] are obtained 
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, downloadable from 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/spf/spf.html#hist 
Remember that in order to estimate the ECB empirical reaction function at time 
t, we have used the (preliminary and incomplete) data that are contained in the financial 
market information set at t, rather than final and revised macroeconomic data. 
SENTt and its associated gSENTt can be downloaded at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/business_consumer_surveys/bcs
series_en.htm. For more information about this index, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/business_consumer_surveys/use
rguide_en.pdf. 
MSCI Index – Euro Credit Corporate Spread is our proxy for the corporate 
bond spread used in section 6. 
All websites were last accessed on January 31st 2005.  
The data set is available from the authors upon request. 
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Table A1.  – ECB President announcements about future monetary policy 
moves 
 
 
Date Risk min max Date Risk min max
07/01/1999 0 0 0 03/01/2002 0 0 0
04/02/1999 -1 -2 -1 07/02/2002 0 0 0
04/03/1999 -2 -3 -2 07/03/2002 0 0 0
08/04/1999 -1 -1 -1 04/04/2002 0 0 0
06/05/1999 0 0 0 02/05/2002 1 1 1
02/06/1999 0 0 0 06/06/2002 1 1 1
NA 04/07/2002 1 1 1
NA NA
09/09/1999 2 2 3 12/09/2002 -3 -3 -2
07/10/1999 3 3 3 10/10/2002 0 -1 0
04/11/1999 2 2 2 07/11/2002 -3 -3 -3
02/12/1999 2 2 2 05/12/2002 -2 -2 -1
05/01/2000 2 2 2 09/01/2003 -3 -3 -2
03/02/2000 ? ? ? 06/02/2003 -3 -3 -2
02/03/2000 3 3 3 06/03/2003 -1 -2 -1
13/04/2000 3 3 3 03/04/2003 0 -1 0
11/05/2000 3 3 3 08/05/2003 -3 -3 -2
08/06/2000 2 2 3 05/06/2003 -1 -2 -1
06/07/2000 3 3 3 10/07/2003 0 -2 0
NA NA
14/09/2000 3 3 3 04/09/2003 0 -2 0
05/10/2000 2 2 2 02/10/2003 0 0 0
02/11/2000 2 2 3 06/11/2003 0 0 0
14/12/2000 3 3 3 04/12/2003 0 0 0
NA 08/01/2004 0 0 0
01/02/2001 1 1 2 05/02/2004 0 0 0
01/03/2001 1 1 1 04/03/2004 0 0 0
11/04/2001 -1 -1 0 01/04/2004 0 0 0
10/05/2001 -1 -1 -1 06/05/2004 0 0 0
07/06/2001 -1 -1 -1 03/06/2004 1 1 1
05/07/2001 -1 -1 -1
NA
30/08/2001 -1 -2 -1
11/10/2001 -2 -2 -2
08/11/2001 -1 -1 -1
06/12/2001 0 0 0
 
 
NOTE: January 1999 - June 2004. We report the degree of risk to price stability of each ECB President 
press conference: its construction is based on Table 1. Min-Max stands for a sort of confidence interval. 
Note that we have considered only the first press conference of each month.  
We have highlighted in grey all the observations we have not used in the forecasting regressions. In 
particular: 
- we were not able to codify the press conference of 03/02/2000  because the wording of the ECB 
President referred to the past and thus was not forward-looking. 
- NA when the press conference did not take place. 
- we consider both December 1999 (Millennium effect) and September 11th 2001 (terrorist attack) 
exceptional events. 
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Table A2.  – Economic and monetary variables featuring in the ECB official documents 
 
Monthly Bulletin Press Conference
1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Economic Variables
Growth of euro area real GDP 12 12 12 12 48 2 9 7 9 27
Expected real GDP growth NA 3 7 5 2 17
Economic activity in the Euro area NA 0 6 5 3 14
HICP 12 12 12 12 48 NA
Expected consumer price inflation NA 2 2 3 2 9
Capacity utilisation 2 4 2 0 8 0 3 2 0 5
Investment / Consumption 
decision in the Euro area NA 1 3 6 4 14
Industrial / Consumer confidence 9 9 10 7 35 3 9 3 6 21
Industrial production 5 4 1 0 10 NA
Fiscal policy 5 9 11 7 32 5 6 2 3 16
Employment 9 12 10 9 40 1 7 3 7 18
Wages 8 12 12 12 44 1 6 9 7 23
Energy prices 11 9 10 9 39 5 5 5 4 19
Oil price 9 12 9 7 37 4 8 7 9 28
Raw material prices 3 0 0 0 3 NA
Services prices 6 1 3 4 14 4 1 0 4 9
Consumer prices 4 6 1 0 11 0 5 7 7 19
Producer prices 2 6 3 2 13 0 1 2 1 4
Food prices 8 3 9 10 30 6 3 7 6 22
World / USA economy 11 9 8 11 39 5 8 8 2 23
Forecast of world growth NA 5 7 0 0 12
Exchange rate 11 12 6 5 34 1 9 6 3 19
Government bond yields 1 3 2 0 6 NA
Bond yields 10 9 6 3 28 6 7 5 1 19
Yield curve 5 6 1 0 12 0 0 3 0 3
Nominal interest rate 3 3 1 3 10 NA
Real interest rate 2 0 1 0 3 NA
Short-term interest rate 7 1 6 4 18 NA
Long-term interest rate 6 5 7 0 18 NA
Interest rates NA 5 0 1 3 9
Liquidity NA 3 2 3 11 19
Monetary Variables
M3 12 12 12 12 48 11 12 10 11 44
M1 1 3 2 6 12 NA
Credit growth 5 4 2 0 11 NA
c/c deposit growth 3 0 0 0 3 NA
Loans to private sector 9 12 10 11 42 11 12 10 10 43
Deposit with agreed maturity < 2 
years 3 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 1
Credit to general government 2 1 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 1
Uncertainty in stock market 0 0 4 7 11 0 0 2 4 6
Financial conditions / 
developments NA 1 3 5 10 19
 
NOTE: January 1999 – December 2002. The table reports economic and monetary variables cited at least 
once in a given issue of the ECB President introductory statement to the monthly press conference and in 
the ECB Monthly Bulletin (Editorial section). From January 1999 to December 2002 there have been 48 
issues of the Monthly Bulletin and 44 press conferences held by the ECB President took place (either at 
the beginning or at the middle of the month). Exceptional (one-time) events (such as the 11th September 
2001 terrorist attack, Kosovo conflict, UMTS auction, etc.) have not been reported. NA stands for not 
applicable. 
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Appendix B – Fuzzy regression 
 
In this Appendix we use non-linear fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965) to empirically 
investigate the relationship between the independent variable Index introduced in 
section 2 and the future changes of the Repo rate. 
Fuzzy logic is a generalization of conventional (Boolean) logic: it allows the 
elements of a fuzzy set to have different grades of membership in [0,1], rather than in 
{0,1}. 
Given the approximate (fuzzy) mode of reasoning, the theory of fuzzy logic is 
well suited to model human decision-making, and in particular lexical uncertainty (i.e., 
linguistic imprecision). 
On the one hand, the ranking of Table 1 is strongly affected by Rosa and 
Verga’s personal judgment. For example, another researcher could have interpreted the 
string “upward pressure remain contained” as +2 or 0 and not necessarily as +1. On the 
other, its scale is ordinal: the only meaningful information conveyed by it consists of the 
relative order among different words, and not by their distance. 
Given the nature of the problem, does the fuzzy regression procedure improve 
the model’s fit with respect to OLS estimations? Moreover, could we get some 
additional information about the underlying relationship between Index and future Repo 
changes? 
Before answering these questions, we briefly review the fuzzy estimation 
technique. 
First, we generated the membership values uit for each Indext with respect to 
cluster i by using the Fuzzy C-Means (FCM) Clustering algorithm (cf. Giles et al., 
2000, page 8 and 9). In particular, in our case, since the sample size is small, we 
imposed three partitions: upward risk (U), no risk (N) and downward risk (D) to price 
stability, initially centred at 1.5, 0, and –1.5 respectively. Then we applied the FCM 
algorithm12: 
a) We generated a new partition of the data by assigning its observation 
to its closest cluster centre. 
b) We calculated new cluster centres as the centroids of the clusters. 
c) We iterated a) and b) until the cluster partitions got stable. 
Our resulting uit have been reported in Table B1. Of course, when Indext is equal 
to Indext+s, then uit  = uit+s. It is interesting to see that when Indext < -1.5 or Indext >1.5, 
                                                 
12 The program written by the authors is available upon request. 
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the corresponding uit is different from the canonical basis of  ℜ3 (respectively given by 
(1,0,0) or (0,0,1))  
Second, we constructed three different sets by looking at the highest 
membership degree of each Indext. Then, we estimated by OLS the following equation: 
 
Rt+m - Rt = αi +βi Indexit +εit         for i ∈{U,N,D}  and  m = 1, …, 6  (B1) 
 
Finally, by combining the first two steps, we have: 
 
Et[Rt+m] - Rt  = ( )
{ }∑∈ +DNUi itiiit Indexu,, βα          for m = 1, …, 6   (B2) 
 
Table B2 reports the fuzzy estimation coefficients. Since by construction the 
shape of the relationship is allowed to change from set to set, overall the estimation 
becomes non-linear. And, therefore (obviously), the R2 reported in Table B2 is always 
higher than the corresponding R2 computed by using standard OLS estimation (cf. Table 
2). 
Figure B1 plots the expected future Repo changes implied by (either 
unconstrained or constrained) OLS and fuzzy regression. 
When m is greater than 1, the shape of the fuzzy relationship between Index and 
expected Repo changes is quite similar. Nevertheless, note that the magnitude of the 
expected reaction of future Repos to a given ECB word is increasing in m, especially 
when the absolute value of Index is large. Thus, it seems that the ECB follows the 
Brainard’s (1967) principle: because of uncertainty, it prefers to make small and gradual 
policy changes rather than a single large one. 
Therefore, on the one hand, when the absolute value of Index is large, the use of 
fuzzy regression methods (with respect to plain OLS) produces clearer results, by 
emphasizing the persistency of the ECB’s monetary policy. However, on the other hand, 
when the absolute value of Index is small, the fuzzy estimation results are more 
ambiguous to interpret that the corresponding OLS estimates. Perhaps, the fuzzy 
regression results do not fully capture that when the value of Index is near zero, the 
expected future ECB policy moves are flat, but with a lot of variance. 
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Table B1.  – Degree of membership uit 
 
 Downward No Risk Upward 
3 0.082 0.184 0.735 
2.5 0.051 0.131 0.818 
2 0.019 0.058 0.923 
1.5 0 0 1 
1 0.031 0.194 0.775 
0 0 1 0 
-0.5 0.19 0.762 0.048 
-1 0.775 0.194 0.031 
-1.5 1 0 0 
-2 0.923 0.058 0.019 
-2.5 0.818 0.131 0.051 
-3 0.735 0.184 0.082 
 
 
 
 
Table B2.  – Fuzzy estimation using ECB words 
 
 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
αD  0.233 - - - - -0.555 
 (0.000) - - - - (0.000) 
βD  0.211  0.129  0.180 -0.234 0.263 - 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
αN - - - - - - 
  - - - - - 
βN -  0.833  0.833  0.833 1.500 1.500 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
αU -0.142 -0.280 -0.367 -0.381 -0.455 -0.776 
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.006) (0.004) (0.018) (0.014) 
βU  0.114  0.215  0.277  0.317 0.375  0.524 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fuzzy OLS R2 0.553 0.566 0.613 0.613 0.572 0.545 
Observations 56 56 56 57 57 56 
 
NOTE: January 1999 – June 2004, monthly observations. p-value in brackets. – stands for a regression 
coefficient constrained to be zero, since in the unconstrained estimation turned out to be not statistically 
significant. The estimator is OLS with HAC-t statistics. The independent variable is the mean of Risk  
( (min+max) / 2 reported in Table A1). 
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Figure B1.  – Estimation of expected future Repo changes using Index  
(Fuzzy Vs OLS) 
 
 
 
NOTE: The sample is January 1999-June 2004, monthly data. The lines represent expected future Repo 
changes, Et[Rt+m] - Rt, using Index as independent variable. 
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Appendix C – Discriminant analysis 
 
This Appendix13 first reviews the methodology of the discriminant analysis (cf., 
for example, Klecka, 1980) and then applies it to forecast the sign of the future Repo 
changes using the same economic variables identified in section 3. 
Let X denote the n × k matrix of n observations and k regressors. Each 
observation can be classified into P groups: in our analysis, there are three groups, 
which correspond to the sign of the Repo change. Note that the partition of the groups is 
given and does not depend on the subjectivity of the researcher. 
The main goal consists in discriminating a new observation into one of the P 
groups, given the value taken by its k regressors. More precisely, the discriminant 
analysis classifies the new observation x* (k × 1 vector) into the group that minimizes 
the following criterion function: 
 
p ∈ argminh (x*- mh)'V-1(x* - mh)    for h = 1, …, P     (C1) 
 
where mh (k × 1 vector) stands for the vector of means of all regressors in each group, 
and V-1 is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of X.14 As standard in 
multivariate statistics, it is sometimes recommended to use the standardized matrix Z 
rather than directly X, and in this case V stands for the correlation (variance-covariance) 
matrix associated to X (Z). 
Since it is difficult to ascertain whether a case is clearly a member of its correct 
group, in our analysis we have used a stochastic version of (C1). In this case, the output 
is a conditional (on the regressors realization) probability that indicates how likely each 
case is of being a member of a given group. Note that to compute these posterior 
probabilities, prior probabilities need to be assumed. 
When the number of regressors is large relative to the number of observations 
(not true in our analysis), then it is useful to extract some latent factors in order to 
identify what mostly distinguishes one group from the other. In particular, the matrix V 
can be decomposed in the sum of VW (variance-covariance matrix within the groups) 
and VB (variance-covariance matrix between the groups). And our goal is to find the 
Fischer discriminant function y = Xa, where a (k × 1 vector) is such that: 
 
                                                 
13 This Appendix was written by Giulio Campanini, a member of the Department of Economics at the 
University of Parma. 
14 Note that when V=Ik (i.e., the regressors are uncorrelated), the criterion function collapses to the 
Euclidean distance. 
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a ∈ argmaxa (a'VBa)/(a'VWa)   s. to  a'a = 1     (C2) 
 
More generally, we want to find the eigenvectors (canonical variables) of the 
matrix (VW)-1VB. Note that the eigenvalues are a direct indicator of the discriminant 
capacity of the associated function.  
Therefore, this last procedure (C2) can be interpreted as a form of principal 
components analysis and aims to reduce a large number of regressors to a few linear 
combinations of them, chosen to capture as much of the variation (and discriminant 
capacity) in the regressors as possible. 
To avoid an overly optimistic estimate of the success of the classification, it is 
usually better to use a cross-validation procedure, which employs one sample to 
compute the classification functions and another sample (drawn from the same 
population) to estimate the proportion misclassified. Below we will use the leave-on-out 
cross-validation method, which consists of two steps. First, we delete a case (test 
sample) and then we compute linear classification functions on the remaining n-1 cases 
(training or learning sample). Second, we use these linear classification functions to 
classify the deleted case into one of the P groups. The procedure is repeated for the 
remaining n-1 cases, and the proportion of the correctly classified cases among those 
deleted is used to estimate the hit rate of the classification procedure. 
Table C1 reports the corrected classification of the sign of the predicted interest 
rate changes by using the discriminant analysis as econometric tool. Before discussing 
the results, it is important to keep in mind that by using a different set of regressors 
(with respect to Repo, INFL, INFLN, CAPF, gE) the fit of the model could have been 
better. In particular, note that often a statistical model with fewer regressors (thus more 
parsimonious) is more useful to classify new cases than one with more variables. 
Our main finding is that once we exclude the 1-month forecasting horizon the 
discriminant analysis slightly improves the percentage of correctly classified cases with 
respect to the ordinal probit regression (cf. Table 5 third row). However, the magnitude 
of the forecasting error sometimes turned out to be larger: in fact, in few cases, our 
estimates suggest future increases in the Repo rate when the actual movements were 
downward or vice versa.  
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Table C1.  – Corrected classification in % using the cross-validation criterion 
Meetings of the Governing Council after:   
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months
Economic variables  76.8 66.1 73.2 71.9 73.7 73.2
(a) (0) (0) (1) (0) (1) (5)
Economic variables  51.8 67.9 75 75.4 73.7 71.4
(b) (0) (0) (1) (1) (2) (4)
Observations 56 56 56 57 57 56 
 
NOTE: January 1999-June 2004, monthly observations. In brackets we report the number of cases where 
a downward change in Repo was forecasted and turned out to be upward (or vice versa). (a) when prior 
probabilities are given by the realized relative frequency of cases. (b) when prior probabilities are equal. 
The leave-on-out cross-validation criterion has been used. 
 
  
 In conclusion, overall the forecasting ability of non-standard econometric 
techniques, such as fuzzy regression and discriminant analysis, is not much better than 
the one of plain OLS and ordinal regressions. Nonetheless, they sometimes provide 
additional and complementary information about the underlying relationship under 
investigation. 
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